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With dwindling personnel resources, there is growing concern over contract
management policies within the DoD as well as questions as to how to improve
contract management efficiency. Defense Contract Management Command (DCMC)
is responsible for performing the majority of contract administration services once a
contract has been awarded. Contract delivery surveillance is an extremely important
tool in monitoring production of an end item and notifying customers of potential
delivery delays. Unfortunately, DCMC personnel available to perform contract
delivery surveillance have not increased proportionately to the contract work load.
This study examines the feasibility of contractor self-oversight and self-
reporting of delivery delays. DCMC's current contract delivery surveillance practices
and procedures are presented and analyzed for effectiveness in notifying the customer
of delays. Two case studies on contractor delay self-forecasting are also analyzed.
The study reveals that there is potential for successful contractor self-oversight
and reporting of delays. As more data becomes available, a cost benefit analysis of
contractor self-oversight and reporting is recommended.
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In today's era of force reduction and diminishing
resources, it is paramount that the Navy find ways to improve
efficiency and productivity while maintaining readiness. The
Defense Contract Management Command (DCMC) is a major element
of the Defense Logistics Agency. DCMC is responsible for
managing over 350,000 prime contracts per fiscal year, with a
value exceeding $800 billion.
Once a contract has been awarded, one of DCMC's many jobs
is to monitor contractor progress. DCMC policy is to
anticipate delivery delinquencies by analyzing surveillance
data and reporting the indicated status to the customer prior
to the scheduled delivery date. The objective of production
surveillance is to provide buying activities with critical
knowledge concerning progress so they may exercise contractual
options and ensure the Government takes timely and appropriate
action. Production surveillance comprises about 5% of DCMC's
almost billion dollar budget.
The Revised Delivery Forecast (RDF) process is the
primary tool for notifying the customer of delinquencies in
delivering items. RDFs provide the purchasing office with
timely automated information concerning delays in the contract
delivery schedule.
The purpose of this research is to examine the
feasibility of motivating contractors through formalized
agreements to self-report real or potential delays in product
delivery. Self-oversight and self-reporting would replace
direct technical surveillance by DoD personnel. This thesis
focuses on the primary and subsidiary research questions set
forth below:
Primary : Is contractor self-oversight and self-reporting
of product delivery delays a feasible option in lieu of
direct technical surveillance by DCMC personnel?
Subsidiary :
(1) How successful is the RDF process in detecting
production delays and forecasting problems
significantly in advance?
(2) What are the most frequent causes for delays in the
production schedule, and who is responsible for
them?
(3) What are the successful elements of current self-
oversight and self-monitoring programs such as the
Process Oriented Contract Administration Services
(PROCAS) program which involves tailoring Government
oversight based on evaluation of critical
manufacturing processes?
B . BACKGROUND
As the DoD continues to face force and budget reductions,
DCMC is tasked with exploring opportunities that will provide
maximum supportability subject to resource constraints.
Contract management is an important part of military
logistics, and it has a direct impact on mission success.
Initiatives that can significantly increase efficiency,
without risk to mission capability and success, are worth
investigation.
The Department of Defense has already sought to reduce
cost without sacrificing readiness, such as with PROCAS. This
initiative teams government and contractors in a professional
relationship to identify and improve critical processes and
ensure successful contract completion. PROCAS focuses on
identifying a teaming arrangement between the contractor,
military customer, DCMC and other government agencies such as
Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) . The teaming agreement
can be either formal, with a written, signed document, or
informal, sealed with a handshake. [Ref l:p.8]
PROCAS has had some success in reducing contract
surveillance efforts. For example, it cut invoice processing
time at Magnavox by 80%. Basically, team members identify
process improvements that will reduce government surveillance
without compromising government interests. PROCAS examines
many processes involved in efficiently and effectively
administering contracts.
Production surveillance and reporting is an important
area to monitor. Overall responsibility for surveillance of
each contractor will be assigned to an Industrial Specialist
(IS). Although the IS has overall responsibility for
surveillance, the Procurement Technician (PT) often performs
most of the surveillance activity.
The IS has to anticipate production problems, to assure
corrective actions and to recommend preventive actions in
order to assure that the customer is aware of all events that
could bear on a contractor's ability to meet contractual
requirements. The using and buying activities need to be
aware of forecasted and actual delays in production schedules.
Approximately 70% of all contracts meet production schedules;
the rest are delayed.
C. SCOPE OF THESIS
The study will be divided into two major parts. First,
it will evaluate current DCMC management practices at the
Defense Contract Management Command. Second, the research
will determine the elements and conditions necessary for
contractor self-oversight. The research will conclude by
determining whether self-oversight and self-reporting has the
potential to improve contract management effectiveness.
D. METHODOLOGY
Information regarding contractor self-oversight and
applications to production surveillance (specifically to RDFs)
was obtained through published literature, case studies, and
DCMC monthly status reports. General Accounting Office and
Office of Inspector General reports concerning production
surveillance and contractor self-oversight were examined.
Sample contractor schedule forecasts were also collected and
examined to determine their accuracy.
Finally, the conditions that need to be in place for
contractor self-oversight and self-reporting will be
identified to determine the potential benefits of contractor
self-oversight and self-reporting to DCMC and DoD.
E . ORGANIZATION
There are four remaining chapters. Chapter II provides
historical background on Government contractor self-oversight
programs. Chapter III examines current DCMC contract delivery
surveillance procedures. Chapter IV provides: (1) an
examination of the effectiveness of the RDF process, (2) two
selected contractor case studies in the self-reporting of
delays, and (3) positive elements of past Government self-
oversight successes. Chapter V contains a summary of the




This chapter will provide background on DCMC, and a brief
history of previous and current contractor self-governance
programs. This chapter will end by describing the
Mechanization of Contract Administration Services and how the
Revised Delivery Forecast portion can be used to promote
contractor self-oversight.
B. DCMC BACKGROUND
The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) furnishes material
support and services to the military. DLA also supports
material procurement by administering contracts after they are
awarded by defense agencies or individual services. Prior to
1990, contract administration was conducted by DLA's Defense
Contract Administration Services (DCAS) . [Ref 2:p.3] In June
1989, Secretary of Defense Cheney recommended making
improvements to the Defense acquisition process. One of the
recommendations was to consolidate all contract administration
functions performed in both DLA and the various military
departments. The purpose of this consolidation was stated in
Mr. Cheney's address to Congress:
The consolidated management of contract
administration will provide uniform procurement
policy, permit the upgrading in the quality of the
CAS work force, reduce overhead and payroll costs.
The consolidated management will also permit the
CAS structure to be streamlined from nine regions
into five districts. [Ref 3:p.ll]
On 26 February 1990, DCMC was formed and charged with
DoD-wide contract management support, engineering and program
support, guality assurance, and contractor payment activity.
DCMC's mission is to administer Defense Contracts for the
military services, other Department of Defense Components,
Federal Civil Agencies and, when authorized, to Foreign
Governments. DCMC's mission elements are:
* To assure contractor compliance with cost,
delivery, technical, quality, and other terms of
the contract,
* To accept products on behalf of the Government,
* To pay the contractor, and
* To provide program support. [Ref 3:p.ll]
In 1990, DCMC was originally divided into five geographic
districts within the United States and one district for
international contracts. These districts included: West,
South, Mid-Atlantic, Northeast, North Central, and Dayton for
international contracts. [Ref 3:p.l2] At the time it was
established, DCMC maintained a work force of approximately
25, 000 people.
Each district contained many field offices. These field
offices were and still are comprised of Defense Contract
Administration Offices (DCMAO) , Defense Plant Representative
8
Offices (DPRO) , and Defense Contract Administrative Offices
(DCMO)
.
DCMAOs are responsible for a defined region that contains
contractors with small to medium size Government contracts.
DCMAOs administer their contracts from a central office.
DPROs are established at the site of large contractor plants
and are responsible for administering all contracts maintained
by the contractor. Also located at the contractor's plant are
DCMOs which differ from DPROs in that they report to a DCMAO
and they may not have the capability to perform the full range
of contract administrative services. [Ref 4:p.l7]
In a 1994 memorandum to the Secretaries of the Military
Departments, Secretary of Defense, Dr. William J. Perry, again
addressed the need for acquisition reform. In the memorandum,
he stated:
The Department of Defense (DoD) faces unprecedented
challenges in preserving force effectiveness in
light of a radically changed threat, substantially
declining defense budgets, and rapidly changing
technology. The existing acquisition system will
not be, and in some cases already is not, capable
of responding to customer needs in this new
environment. The fact is-the world in which DoD
must operate has changed beyond the limits of the
existing acquisition system's ability to adjust or
evolve-it must be totally reengineered. [Ref 5:p.l-
2]
DCMC quickly experienced the reality of Secretary Perry's
statement, with cuts in its personnel and budget. By 28
January 1996, the remaining Southern District Headquarters
workload had been transferred to districts East and West.
[Ref 6:p.6] What had begun as five major districts had
dwindled down to two with the international contracts still
being administered by the Dayton office. DCMC's work force
had decreased from 25,000 to 16,000. [Ref 7]
To provide quality goods and services with an ever
declining work force, DCMC developed a new philosophy,
entitled Performance Based Management (PBM) . This philosophy
developed from a program by the same name that evaluated
contractors' risk assessment efforts. [Ref 7] This philosophy
linked contractor performance with the appropriate level of
contract administration surveillance. Simply put, PBM placed
the right people in the right place at the right time, doing
the right thing. PBM was built on the positive aspects of
past successes. [Ref 8:p.A-5] Fundamental to the PBM
philosophy was seeking programs, such as contractor self-
oversight initiatives, that encourage the Government and the
contractor to work as a team to mitigate the effects of
diminishing personnel and resources.
DCMC was faced with balancing the risk associated with
reducing oversight against the Government costs to ensure
compliance. Thus, seeking other means of maintaining contract
coverage became essential. One of the possibilities DCMC
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examined to alleviate the continuing reduction in force was to
promote more contractor self-governance programs.
C. BACKGROUND ON SELF-GOVERNANCE PROGRAMS
One of the Government's first attempts to increase cost-
effectiveness with industry was the Contractor Risk Assessment
Guide (CRAG) Program. Basically, the program invited
contractors to assess their internal controls on a voluntary
basis. If contractors could demonstrate that they had
implemented internal control systems that met CRAG control
objectives, they could potentially receive less Government
oversight. [Ref 3:p.9]
The program was jointly developed by the Under Secretary
of Defense for Acquisition, the Inspector General, DoD, the
Director of the Defense Contract Audit Agency, and the defense
industry. The program was approved and published by the
Government in 1988. The goals of the program were to
strengthen contractor internal controls through self-
governance and increase the efficiency and effectiveness of
DoD's oversight effort.
Unfortunately, the program encountered a variety of
problems. At the time, the Government maintained an
adversarial relationship with the defense industry. In
addition, many contractors failed to see any benefits from the
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CRAG program. It did not allow additional overhead funds to
enhance internal controls. [Ref 3:p.9]
Prior to the CRAG program, DCMC developed the Contractor
Quality Assurance Program (CQAP) to address customer
dissatisfaction with the growing number of in-stock
nonconforming parts. This program focused on defect
detection. Unfortunately, CQAP promoted a "policeman"
mentality because it concentrated on inspecting the products
for conformance and emphasized identifying and managing
defects
.
The Government realized setting inadequate requirements
that lacked the necessary emphasis on building quality into
every process effecting design, manufacturing, and
distribution also leads to a high concentration of products
that are of poor quality. [Ref 9:p.l8] Recognizing these
shortcomings, CQAP evolved into the In-Plant Quality
Evaluation Program (IQUE). This program espoused the same
ideals but instead centered on defect prevention. [Ref 10:p.7]
The IQUE Program recognized that if contractors adopt
self-governance through Total Quality Management (TQM)
practices, it can reduce Government oversight. [Ref ll:p,13]
Thus, with the ever increasing workload and diminishing
personnel resources, DCMC established IQUE in its move toward
contractor self-governance.
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IQUE was designed to assess whether the contractor's
processes were able to consistently satisfy the contract
requirements. IQUE focused on assuring that the contractor
could accurately and effectively transform inputs into
products. [Ref 13:p.l3]
The IQUE Program's biggest benefit was the improved
channels of communication between the Government and
contractors. In addition, IQUE was instrumental in shifting
the focus away from the end product onto the production
process. [Ref 10:p.7] Although IQUE improved the working
relations between the Government and the contractor, the
program did not improve the contractor's processes; it only
identified processes that were out of control and how to
potentially fix them.
The latest in the long line of contractor self-governance
programs is PROCAS. PROCAS has now usurped IQUE as DCMC's way
of doing business. [Ref 12] The initial elements of PROCAS
were formed by combining IQUE and the best of the military
services' quality self-governance programs. (PROCAS THESIS
p. 12.) Like IQUE, PROCAS determines which processes are high
or low risk. However, it also looks at ways of improving the
contractor's operational process or processes. It is
important to note that DCMC personnel can only recommend
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changes to the process. The contractor cannot interpret
suggestions as orders or constructive changes to the contract.
PROCAS combines the common features of the most
successful contract administration techniques and approaches,
including:
* process orientation vs. end item accept or reject,
* teaming in lieu of adversarial relationships, and
* identification of objective measures of
performance rather than Government inspections.
Implementing PROCAS means that teams are formed around
processes that are critical to the contractor's operation.
The teaming aspect unites DCMC, the customer, the contractor,
and DCAA, and focuses their efforts on continuous process
improvement. [Ref 8: p. A- 3]
The process team examines the process and develops
metrics to analyze, adjust and improve the process within the
boundaries of the teaming agreement. The teaming agreement
can be formal, with a written, signed document or informal
with a handshake. It is important to note that this agreement
does not change the terms and conditions of the contract. [Ref
l:p.8] The agreement allows the Government and industry to
jointly emphasize teamwork and continuous improvement. [Ref
3:p.32]
DCMC is currently using PROCAS to determine the
appropriate level of oversight to provide. However, DCMC's
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philosophy of Performance Based Management encourages them to
continuously improve their ability to provide their customers
outstanding contract management support.
D. BACKGROUND ON CONTRACTOR SELF-REPORTING OF DELAYS
Production surveillance requires tremendous human and
financial resources to manage properly. It involves four
primary activities:
* Review Contract,
* Develop Surveillance Plan,
* Perform Surveillance, and
* Perform Corrective Action as Necessary.
After reviewing the contract, the appropriate
surveillance is determined by the criticality designator
assigned by the purchasing office. The team leader in charge
of the contract documents the surveillance level in a
surveillance plan. [Ref 13]
Surveillance should provide the continuous status of
contract line item deliveries and associated problems. This
ensures that the contractor's control systems and corrective
actions are adequate and in compliance with contract
requirements. In addition, the plan identifies both the
surveillance to be provided on the contract and the
information needed for an RDF when the production schedule of
a line item is delayed. When the information is compiled, the
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RDF is entered into the Mechanization of Contract
Administration Services (MOCAS) data base.
MOCAS is an internal DCMC system designed by DLA to
implement and respond to the Military Standard Contract
Administration Procedures (MILSCAP) . In addition, this
automated data system provides management and operational data
on delivery schedules, shipments, contractual changes, and
disbursements to contractors.
When a contract is awarded, the Procuring Contracting
Officer (PCO) always distributes hard copy contracts and
modifications to the contractor, Administration Office, and
Payment Office. Sometimes, the contract and PCO modification
data is also transmitted electronically from PCO computer to
DCMC's MOCAS system. The MOCAS data base is separated into
five main categories for each contract:
* Inventory Data - status of the document,
* Administrative and Address Data - type contract,
contractor data,
* Accounting and Provisions Data - funding and
payment limitations,
* Line Item and Schedule Data - quantities due and
dates, and
* Shipment Data - shipments at line item level.
Previously, when DCMC learned that an item might be
delinquent by telephone inquiry or official inspection, the
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DLA Form 1654, Delay in Delivery, was generated. In 1987, an
enhancement was made to MOCAS's line item and schedule data to
automatically transmit RDFs . These notices are generated by
the Industrial Specialist and Procurement Technician providing
forecasted recovery dates. They are endorsed by the
Administrative Contracting Officer (ACO) with a recommended
action to the PCO. [Ref 14:p.I-5]
With DCMC's drawdown in personnel and resources, they
must find alternative ways to perform production surveillance.
The number of personnel is decreasing significantly without
an eguivalent decrease in workload. DCMC has initiated a
pilot program to test motivating contractors through
formalized agreements to self-report real or potential
delivery delays in lieu of direct DCMC technical surveillance.
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY
With the drawdown in personnel, DCMC is forced to seek
alternative methods of providing the necessary contract
administrative services. One solution is contractor self-
oversight. Under the Performance Based Measurement
philosophy, DCMC strives to continually improve the way it
conducts business. As evidenced above, contractor self-
oversight programs have evolved to incorporate new and better
management techniques.
17
Contractor self-reporting of delays presents another
potential way for DCMC to reward proven reliable contractors
and channel DCMC ' s limited personnel to other areas that
require more attention and surveillance.
The following chapter will address DCMC's current
production management practices.
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III. CURRENT DCMC CONTRACT DELIVERY SURVEILLANCE PRACTICES
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will describe current DCMC practices
regarding production surveillance and the RDF's role in the
process. First, RDFs will be defined and then the use of RDFs
by the buying activity and DCMC will be discussed. In
addition, the procedure for initiating an RDF will be
depicted. Finally, this chapter will address the changing
cultural climate of DCMC and how this will affect the RDF
process .
B. BACKGROUND ON RDFs
RDFs are essential for reporting product assurance and
production status to DCMC customers. They notify customers of
potential or real delays, forecast probable delivery dates,
and code the reason for delay. [Ref 15:p.6-2] This type of
notification is critical so that customers may either exercise
contractual options or adjust their resources to meet
alternative requirements, rather than holding money for a
delivery that is delayed.
RDFs are an automated program within the MOCAS data base
for reporting delays in delivery. Depending on the contract
clause requirements, RDFs can be used in lieu of the hand
typed DD Form 375-2 Delay in Delivery Report. The needs of
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the purchasing activity determine which form of notification
will be used. RDFs can be sent via two methods, routable and
nonroutable, depending on the customer's capability or
preference.
If the RDF is nonroutable, the MOCAS program displays a
second screen on the computer which allows the Industrial
Specialist (IS) or Procurement Technician (PT) to create
narrative information. [Ref 15:p.6-2] Nonroutables occur when
there is no match in the MOCAS data base for the buying
activity's Department of Defense Activity Address Code
(DoDAAC) . This occurs if the activity's DoDAAC code does not
exist within the MOCAS data base. The MOCAS system then
generates a form similar to the DD Form 375-2 that can be
mailed to the buying activity in question. The DD Form 375-2
is still used today; it is a hard copy delay notification
which allows for a more extensive narrative. [Ref 16:p.3]
If the MOCAS system finds a matching DoDAAC code, the RDF
is routable. Once determined routable by the MOCAS system, no
narrative information is allowed and the RDF is transmitted
directly from the DCMC computer to the buying activity'
s
computer. The buying activity will receive a three digit
alphanumeric code indicating the cause for delay.
20
Generally, an RDF will contain the following information:
* DCMC activity issuing the RDF,
* Buying activity's contract number,
* Line item number and quantity being delayed,
* Revised Delivery Date,
* Reason for delinquency, and
* DCMC commentary if applicable.
Although the RDF contains only basic information, it
still remains a vital tool for the buying activity to assess
contractor performance. 1 Two other reports affect the RDF
process: 30/60 Day Advance Delivery Alert, Contractor
Inventory Delinquency Report (CIDR)
.
The 30/60 Day report displays all contracts with a
category 2 surveillance that are scheduled for delivery within
the next 1 or 2 months after the report month. There are two
types of surveillance which are divided into categories 1 and
2. The differences between the two types of surveillance will
be discussed in more detail later in this chapter. The
Industrial Specialist, or Procurement Technician uses this
report to monitor these contracts and determine whether an RDF
should be sent out.
TDCMC Policy Letter No. 96-4 dated 1 April 1996
directed commands to use alternate methods of reporting
delivery status in place of RDFs until the new ALERTS
delivery status software program installation is complete
21
The CIDR lists all contracts delinquent over 30 days and
records all RDFs that were issued for each delinquent
contract. It is an important tool in assessing whether DCMC
personnel have been notifying customers of delinquencies in a
timely fashion.
C. PRODUCTION SURVEILLANCE AND RDF INITIATION PROCESS
1. CONTRACT RECEIPT
When a contract is received for administration, DCMC is
authorized to perform numerous functions (Figure 1) . One of
its many responsibilities involves production support,
surveillance, and status reporting. This includes timely
reporting of potential and actual delays in contract delivery
schedules. Under the realm of production surveillance, DCMC
reviews the contract and analyzes the contractor's performance
plans, schedules, controls, and industrial processes to
determine how much surveillance to perform. [Ref 17 :p. 42-15]
Administrative Contract Office (ACO) teams are formed to
establish surveillance plans. They consist of DCMC personnel
with different specialties. The teams assess new contracts
and evaluate contract modifications to develop surveillance
plans or to determine necessary adjustments to existing





















PROCESS RDF AND ALERT
Figure 1
.
Contract Delivery Surveillance Flow Chart
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process, each team member completes a contract review
checklist according to his or her field of expertise. For
example, the Industrial Specialist and Procurement Technician
will complete a checklist based on production whereas an
Industrial Engineer will complete one based on engineering.
2. MOCAS DATA VERIFICATION
The Defense Finance Administration Services (DFAS)
provides finance and accounting services for the DoD. The
DFAS center located in Columbus, Ohio is responsible for
paying all major contracts managed by DCMC using the MOCAS
system. DFAS reviews each incoming contract and extracts data
for the MOCAS data base.
While DFAS performs this function, the ACO team receives,
distributes, and corrects contracts within MOCAS. Once the
actual contract is received, it should be compared with the
contract abstract, and any errors should be promptly
corrected. [Ref 19:p.21-l] In particular, it is essential that
the IS compare the actual contract to the abstract to check
the accuracy of line item quantities and schedule dates, as
well as line item format and designations. The ACO team can
make corrections to the MOCAS data base but, there are
limitations to the type of corrections the ACO team can make.
They are not able to make any corrections that may change the
terms of the contract. These corrections are made by the
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Purchasing Contract Office (PCO) only. The ACO corrective
actions are limited to:
* Section Moves,
* Kind or Type Contract,
* Criticality Designator,
* Defense Priority Assignment System Rating,
* Commodity Code,
* Inspection and Acceptance Code,
* Line Item Numbers,
* National Stock Number,
* Part Number,
* Quantity Variation Overrun or Underrun,
* Unit of Measure,
* Total Quantity on Order, or
* Service Completion Date. [Ref 20]
The ACO team is responsible for ensuring that any
corrections or modifications to the contract match the DFAS
inputs within the MOCAS database. If they do not, the ACO
team either effects the change or forwards the discrepancy to
DFAS for correction. [Ref 13]
3. PERFORM CONTRACTOR RISK ASSESSMENT
DCMC determines the extent of production surveillance
based on the criticality assigned by the PCO to the supplies
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or services (degree of importance to the Government) and
several additional factors including:
* Contract requirements for reporting production
progress and performance,
* Contractor's production plan,
* Contractor's history of contract performance,
* Contractor's experience with the contract supplies
or services,
* Contractor's financial capability, and
* Any supplementary written instructions from the
buying activity. [Ref 17:p. 42-15]
In order to determine the appropriate surveillance
requirements, the IS must examine the risk elements associated
with the contract type and the criticality designator
identified by the purchasing activity. Presently there are
two types of surveillance categories. Both categories require
DCMC to administer predelivery surveillance and status. [Ref
21]
Typically, surveillance categories are assigned based on
the buying activity's criticality designator. Normally, the
Procuring Contracting Office (PCO) will assign a criticality
designator of "A" to contracts with Defense Priority System
rating of DX (the highest rating), service directed critical
programs, or emergencies. A criticality designator of "B"
will be assigned to contracts needed to maintain a production
or repair line. All other contracts receive a criticality
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designator of "C." Contracts that have been assigned a
criticality designator of "A" typically receive category 1
surveillance; all other contracts normally receive category
2 surveillance.
Despite this convention, it is still important to conduct
a risk assessment of all contract elements and the
contractor's assurance and manufacturing processes to ensure
the appropriate surveillance code is assigned. A surveillance
category should not be prematurely assigned based solely on
the criticality designator determined by the PCO.
The first step in determining the contractor's risk
elements is to identify the customer's requirements. The IS
should review contract elements such as system requirements,
schedule, cost controls, and defense priority. It is the
responsibility of the IS to examine customer guidance or
direction, such as Customer Priority Lists, to clearly
understand the customer's needs and expectations (the CPL is
a list that requires DCMC to provide the customer with
accelerated reporting on status of production due to the
sensitive or critical nature of the product or service) . [Ref
19:p.21-3]
Next, the IS needs to identify the processes by reviewing
whether the contractor's production plans satisfy contract
requirements, and evaluating them for adequacy. Processes can
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be defined as a series of tasks leading to a common objective
that satisfies a requirement, such as making a handle. [Ref
22:p.34] From the contractor's plans and customer
requirements, the IS develops a sequence of events chart.
This chart identifies pacing events (both contractor and
Government) with which to assess progress. Critical processes
are identified by considering those processes that are likely
to significantly affect contract schedule or cost. [Ref
19:p.21-3] It is important to identify the critical processes
in production because they help in assessing the level of
contract risk.
To assess the level of risk, the IS considers the
contractor's performance history by reviewing relevant
Government and contractor data, such as customer input, RDFs,
delivery performance history, deviations, waivers, process
control data, and process stability. Each critical process
will be classified into either low, moderate or high risk.
Low risk involves data that provides confidence in
process performance. Low risk processes will only be subject
to periodic verification using product audits. Product audits
are tests of contractor produced products performed by DCMC
Quality Assurance Specialists. These supplement contractor
performed tests to assess the contractor's ability to measure
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the process effectively by examining products that the
contractor has determined to be conforming. [Ref 22: p. 34]
If the data available is insufficient to characterize the
process as low risk, it will be categorized as medium risk.
Product audits will be used to verify critical process outputs
until the process or processes are proofed. Process Proofing
determines the adequacy of contractor processes by thoroughly
reviewing whether the inputs can be expected to achieve the
desired outcomes. It includes identifying and flow charting
the process sequence, and reviewing process inputs. [Ref
22: p. 34] Product Audits are used more intensively in medium
risk contracts to ensure that the contractor is providing
conforming products. [Ref 19:p.21-3]
High risk category processes involve data which casts
doubt on process performance. Process proofing is essential
and must be scheduled as soon as possible. Intensive, frequent
product audits should be conducted to verify that the
contractor is providing the Government with conforming
products at high confidence level. [Ref 19:p.21-3]
Although the criticality designator usually determines
the surveillance category, it is still important to identify
all risk elements so that the appropriate surveillance is
provided. Once all risk elements have been categorized, the
IS can determine whether the contract warrants category 1 or
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2 surveillance. As more critical processes are classified as
high risk, more surveillance is justified.
4. DEVELOP TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE PLAN
Once the level of risk has been determined, the IS
develops a written plan to monitor the contractor's critical
product assurance and manufacturing processes, establish
surveillance points during production, and report production
status to the buying activity.
The level of surveillance will depend on the level of
risk and the complexity of the contract. In general, the plan
identifies contract requirements, critical milestones, major
risk areas, pacing events, success or problem indicators, and
the buying activity's special interest items. [Ref 23:p.4] At
a minimum, all plans should include the following:
* Strategy and tactics for customer input to
surveillance planning,
* Critical processes in each risk category,
* Safety of flight aircraft components and systems,
* Surveillance techniques planned for each critical
process,
* Process for anticipating delivery delinquencies,
and
* Process for production complete actions. [Ref
19:p.21-4]
Most importantly the IS establishes who is responsible
for which parts of the surveillance plan. In addition, the IS
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ensures that an adequate teaming arrangement and good lines of
communication are established between the Government and the
contractor
.
5. PERFORM PRODUCTION SURVEILLANCE
It is the IS's responsibility to ensure that the
surveillance tasks are performed as outlined in the
surveillance plan. In particular, the IS must use personal
judgment to determine the exact intensity and frequency of
product audits. Although the surveillance plan delineates the
tasks to be performed, the IS does have some leeway in
deciding how to tailor the amount and frequency of production
surveillance
.
The amount of in-plant surveillance depends on the
surveillance category. For category 1 surveillance, the IS
conducts monthly follow-on plant visits. The plant visits
are conducted in conjunction with pacing events. The IS is
responsible for the following actions:
* verify placement of orders and subcontracts,
* observe physical presence of inventory,
* discuss actual or potential problems,
* evaluate corrective actions, and
* develop revised delivery forecasts.
Category 2 surveillance is normally handled by the PT by
telephone, as opposed to in-plant visits. The PT telephones
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the contractor at the forecasted completion time for each
major pacing event. In either case, the IS or PT will gather
the necessary information to determine the causes of and
impacts from any change in the delivery schedule, including:
* nature of delay,
* length of delay,
* repetition of delay,
* corrective action plan,
* cause for delay Government or contractor,
* need for revision in contractor' s plan, and
* need for revision in Government's surveillance
plan. [Ref 24]
If this information indicates that the delay will impact the
delivery schedule, then an RDF will be initiated.
In addition to the RDF, there is a new system for
reporting delays in Government contracts, known as DCMC'
s
ALERTS program. An ALERTS message is also transmitted along
with the RDF. The ALERTS system allows for more extensive
narrative and more immediate communication between the ACO
team and the PCO. The eventual goal is to replace the RDF
notification system with the ALERTS system.
Depending on the nature of delay, the IS will identify
the appropriate alphanumeric code for the cause and a revised
delivery date for the contract line items and guantity
affected. These will be reported to the ACO team. The ACO
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team will examine the IS's recommendation and decide whether
or not to support the recommendation. The RDF will be sent to
the PCO with the revised delivery date and the alphanumeric
code for delay on the line items affected. The ACO will
recommend whether or not contractual options should be
undertaken.
Once the PCO decides to continue with production, the IS
determines whether or not to adjust the surveillance plan.
After this determination has been made, the IS will verify
MOCAS data, reassess the risk if necessary, and monitor
production and delivery schedules. The IS or PT will continue
contract surveillance until another delay in production occurs
or the contract is complete.
D. CURRENT CHANGING CULTURAL CLIMATE OF DCMC AND IMPACT ON
PRODUCTION SURVEILLANCE
In many contractor facilities, several different
processes or specifications may be used for similar
manufacturing operations because various military and
commercial contracts have different requirements. This
approach is inefficient and increases the Government's and
contractor's costs and administrative workload. [Ref 25:p.l]
In the past, the military required the contractor to conform
to set production specifications, such as the MIL Q 9858A
standard. This specification was placed in a contract to
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incorporate process control as a contractual requirement and
ensure that certain Government standards would be met.
In June 1994, the DoD took a major step towards
implementing real reform by authorizing commercial
specifications and standards. This initiative applied to new
contracts only. In December 1995, Paul Kaminiski, the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, approved
the "Single Process Initiative" to incorporate existing
contracts into the 1994 initiative. [Ref 26] The Single
Process Initiative modifies all existing contracts held by
any one contractor as a block, not contract by contract.
These initiatives help eliminate the multiple
manufacturing processes imposed on the contractor. By the end
of fiscal year 1996, the Government will not use the MIL Q
standards; instead they will focus on commercial practices
such International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 9000
standards
.
ISO 9000 is a set of management standards on quality
assurance. There are twelve key elements that incorporate
this management based quality system. They include such areas
as management responsibility, contract review and process
control in production.
Once a contractor receives certification as an ISO 9000
company, DCMC can generate a quality letter of compliance with
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ISO 9000 standards. [Ref 12] The contractor can then prepare
a proposal to change all their existing contracts with the
Government under the umbrella of the "Single Process
Initiative." This will circumvent the MIL Q standards imposed
by existing contractual clauses.
It is important to note that the quality letter issued by
DCMC does not affect the terms of the contract and does not
imply automatic product compliance. The letter of quality
only indicates that the contractor has a good quality system
in place. The ISO 9000 certification process is similar to
performing risk analysis for the amount of production
surveillance. [Ref 12] Potentially, DCMC may use ISO
certifications to determine the degree of Government
surveillance and the contractor's ability to self report
delays in delivery.
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY
The broad function of production surveillance can consume
40 to 50% of the Contract Administration Team's time. There
is more involved than just providing pertinent information to
the purchasing activity if there is going to be a delay in
delivery. It is important to identify the risks associated
with the contractor's processes and tailor the amount of
surveillance accordingly.
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The next chapter will present data obtained from DCMC and
assess the quality of DCMC ' s production surveillance and the
ability of selected contractors to self-report delays in
delivery.
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IV. DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS
A. INTRODUCTION
To determine the effectiveness of the RDF process, the
district level performance and then the administrative office
level performance will be described and examined. Data from
an administrative office level Contractor Inventory
Delinquency Report (CIDR) will also be analyzed. Case studies
will be presented on two selected contractors, evaluating
their ability to perform some of the contract administrator's
work in the contract delivery surveillance process. Finally,
the elements of a successful case of PROCAS, an established
oversight program, will be assessed.
B. RDF PERFORMANCE
First, the overall performance of RDF coverage in Defense
Contract Management Command District West (DCMCDW) at the
beginning of the year was compared to that of the end of the
year. Figure 2 shows the percentage of RDFs that were issued
less than 30 days in advance. Figure 3 represents the
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advance. The goal of DCMCDW is to issue RDFs more than 30
days in advance to the buying activity.
Figure 2 shows an overall 7% decrease in RDFs that were
issued less than 30 days in advance. Figure 3 shows an 8%
increase in advance warning to the customer from the beginning
of the year for the district level as a whole. The above
trend indicates that emphasis is being placed on notifying the
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Next, the RDFs issued from January to October 1995,
versus delinquent schedules not reported, were compiled for
the district. Figure 4 depicts the percent RDF coverage
versus the percent anticipated RDF coverage. Coverage involves
dividing the quantity of delinquent schedules that were
preceded by a current RDF by the total quantity of delinquent
schedules. Anticipated coverage involves the portion of RDFs
that were issued more than 30 days in advance divided by the
total amount of delinquent schedules. DCMCDW set a goal that
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Figure 4.
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coverage should at least encompass 60% of all delinquent
contracts; anticipated should include 30% of all delinquent
contracts. These goals were not met in 1995. The district
intends to provide 100% anticipated coverage to its customers,
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Next, contract delivery surveillance was tabulated
according to the number of RDFs that were issued by each DPRO
in DCMCDW (Figure 5) . By the end of the fiscal year, only one
DPRO had attained the metric levels set forth by the district:
coverage of 60% and anticipated of 30%. The other four DPROs
did not achieve the metrics. Three of the DPROs did not issue
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The DCMAO' s RDF performance for DCMCDW was also recorded
(Figure 6) . Two of the DCMAOs were able to attain the 60%
district goal for overall RDF coverage. The other nine area
offices did not accomplish this goal. Only one area office
was able to meet the established 30% goal for anticipated
RDFs
. Some districts were able to accomplish reasonable to
modest results for overall coverage, but were more sporadic in
issuing RDFs more than 30 days in advance.
RDF performance was examined further at the
administrative office located in San Francisco (Figure 7). At
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the San Francisco Area Office, the coverage and anticipated
coverage were well below the district goals for the year.
Comparing the number of RDFs issued to delinquent schedules,
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San Francisco's RDF input was further examined by each
contract administration team (Figure 8). Again the amount of
RDF input varied between teams and even within teams. Some
months more RDFs were issued than others. Some teams
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There are apparently some problems with the RDF process.
The RDF gives advance warning to the customer. Figure 2
revealed that at the beginning of 1995 the majority of RDFs
being issued by DCMCDW were less than 30 days in advance.
Towards the end of the year, more emphasis was placed on
notifying the customer sooner. The total percentage of RDFs
that were issued more than 30 days in advance grew from 32 to
40%. Therefore, it appears that DCMCDW is focusing on being
more proactive with the RDF process.
As mentioned before, there are some problems with the RDF
process. The reason why RDFs are issued in less than 30 days
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is sometimes due to the working relationships between the
Government and the contractor. The contractor would rather
say that everything is on schedule and that the delivery date
will be met than come forward early and have to explain why
they won't meet the schedule. [Ref 27]
Another problem that prevents the issuance of RDFs is the
contract administration team's failure to identify critical
manufacturing processes. If the contract administration team
is unable to identify the contractor's critical manufacturing
processes, they will be unable to anticipate problems that may
prevent on time product delivery. Part of this problem is
training. DCMC does not hold supervisors responsible for
reviewing and proofing the contractor's processes. [Ref
22:p.8] Prior to implementing contractor self-oversight
programs, such as PROCAS, many of the contract administrators
only inspected the end result or product.
Perhaps the biggest reason for RDFs being issued with
little or no notice is insufficient Government personnel
resources. Manpower constraints limit the amount of
production surveillance that is performed. This in turn
impacts the RDF process. Manpower limitations are often the
cause for not detecting delays a month in advance. The area
offices sometimes experience declining effective manpower as
they gain responsibility for more contracts, often of smaller
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scope and proportion, without the luxury of being located
within the contractor's facility. As a result, some customers
believe that small dollar contracts get little or no
attention. [Ref 28:p.29] Many customers are concerned about
DCMC resources and support to their organizations. Concerns
include insufficient resources, high turnover, constant
reorganization, and general instability of the DCMC work
force. [Ref 28:p.25]
Despite DCMC manpower limitations, some DPROs and some
area offices have a better record of issuing RDFs . This
depends on the priorities and manpower capabilities of the
organization at the time. One area office located in Phoenix
has increased their RDF submissions by opening the RDF process
up to a wider range of contract administration team members.
RDFs are typically submitted by Industrial Specialists (IS)
and Procurement Technicians (PT) . These often make up only
11% of the contract administration team. When other members
of the team were trained to submit RDFs, they increased
significantly.
On the other hand, as the numbers of ISs and engineers
dwindle, other contract administrators are being pushed into
performing their responsibilities other than RDF initiation.
Unfortunately, these DCMC personnel do not always understand
manufacturing processes like the IS or engineer. As a result,
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these contract administrators have to do on the job training.
This requires a dedicated person, especially if they do not
receive much guidance from their supervisor. This can cause
RDFs to be issued with little notice or to be totally omitted.
There is a data problem that indicates RDF non-compliance
may be overstated. There are a number of contracts that
appear to be delinquent without any notification to the
buying activity. However, a large number of contracts still
indicate being open in the MOCAS system when they have already
been completed. These contracts need to be moved to MOCAS '
s
closed contract section.
The coverage and anticipated percentages are skewed as
shown in Figure 4. The main reason this occurs is due to
manpower and training. There are limited resources and often
administrative tasks are delayed to perform higher priority
tasks. This affects the DCMC's RDF coverage to the customer.
At one area office alone, there are some 3500 contract line
items, but only about 1000 of these are current contracts.
[Ref 29]
Although these completed contracts account for some of
the RDF failures, there still is a problem with insufficient
manning levels to initiate the RDF process. Recently, all
category 3 surveillance contracts have been upgraded to
surveillance 2 contracts. This requires predelivery
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surveillance. In the past, category 3 contracts had not
required predelivery surveillance. Thus, the workload for the
contract administrator has increased while the work force has
diminished.
The DPRO coverage, as represented in Figure 5, was not in
accordance with the district metrics of 60%. Although there
are contract administrators on the site, that does not mean
that there is a cooperative atmosphere with the Government.
In addition, other priorities may take higher precedence over
an RDF notification. If the contract administrative team
members are not held responsible for RDF initiations by the
managers, they tend to focus on other tasks.
C. CIDR EVALUATION
The Contractor Inventory Delivery Report (CIDR) is a
valuable tool for the contract administration team to tabulate
the reasons for delays. It is extremely important to know
what are the typical causes of delay and whether the
Government or contractor was the cause.
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Figure 9 represents data from a CIDR taken from an area
office located in DCMCDW. This CIDR represents the general
trends in the reasons and the responsible party for the delay.
[Ref 30] According to the report, the Government was
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responsible for 20% of the delays and contractors were
responsible for 80%.
The biggest reasons for delay centered around production,
planning, contract modifications and delivery. The
Government's biggest problem was contract modifications.
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However, the contractors were responsible for an almost equal
number of contract modification problems.
The majority of contractor delays involved design,
planning, production, finances, vendor or subcontractor
unreliability, contract modifications, and shipping. All
these problems revolved around processes that affect
manufacturing. The contractor has the ability to anticipate
most of these problems more quickly than the Government.
Unfortunately, communications between the Government and
the contractor are often adversarial . The contractor may know
that a problem exists but does not want to notify the
Government until the schedule is definitely compromised.
It is not hard to train contract administrators to do an
RDF; the problem exists with knowing how to identify potential
problems in the contractor's processes that could cause
potential delays down the line. Many times, the contract
administrators cannot perform their responsibilities. They
cannot make suggestions to the contractor on how to improve
his processes, whether they be financial, production or
material control, because they do not have the experience.
Basically, the Government does not always pay enough to retain
specialized personnel and will often lose these personnel to
the private sector. [Ref 27]
50
D. CONTRACTOR FORECASTING
Since the contractor is often aware of production
problems before the Government, some contractors were selected
to forecast their own delivery schedules. Contractors were
selected by the area office. First, the contractor had to be
a willing participant along with the buying activity. In
addition, since a contractor may hold several contracts with
the Government, the area office, the contractor, and the
buying activity had to agree on the contracts to include in
the self-reporting of delivery delinquencies. Finally, the
area office was responsible for establishing a reporting
procedure method which assures:
* processing RDFs in a timely manner,
* updating MOCAS,
* random sampling of contractor data for accuracy,
and
* monitoring accuracy and when forecasts reach 90%
accuracy for at least three consecutive month







1. CONTRACTOR A CASE STUDY
Contractor A has been a contractor with the Government
for several years. The contractor has four major programs
with the Government. Three of the programs are shop type
operations in which only one or two high cost, specialized
items are produced at one time. The fourth program involves
a production line set up to produce several contract line
items. The majority of the contracts held with the Government
are Firm Fixed Price.
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Contractor A has a large facility to support the various
programs and product lines. Since Government contracts are
becoming less and less consistent, the work force is not
always stable. The contractor's stock of raw materials
supports about 80% of the contract delivery schedule.
Each program has different reguirements and different
internal control systems. Three of the programs involve
interaction between purchasing and material control. Due to
the one time nature of the fourth program, the contractor did
not want to set up an internal control system between
purchasing and material control.
The surveillance plan for each program is adjusted
accordingly if a delay in production effects a pacing event.
This happens only with the PCO's (buying activity) approval.
The contractor conducts weekly meetings and monthly reviews
for each of its programs to ensure that the programmed
milestones in the contract are being met.
Before the contractor started to self-forecast delays,
the IS was responsible for reviewing and releasing RDFs . The
PT performed production surveillance unless a problem
occurred, then the IS assisted in the surveillance.
During the contractor self-forecasting period, the
Contract Administrator would send a copy of the 30/60 day
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report to the contractor a month in advance. This was done to
highlight the contract line items that would be coming due
within the next two months. The contractor would fax back a
status report on all the delivery schedules and any reasons
for delinquencies. The Contract Administrator would schedule
meetings with the contractor if there was a problem.
For a six month period, the contractor was over 90%
accurate with forecasts (Figure 10) . However, there was a
problem with one of the high visibility programs during the
last month. Unfortunately, the contractor waited until it was
too late to notify the Government that it was not going to
meet its commitment. These contract line items were critical
to the Government
.
After discussion with the Industrial Specialist on the
contract administration team, this contractor was rated as
good but not outstanding. The IS felt that this contractor
maintained a good working relationship with the Government but
that they were not always forthcoming with details on their
work in each program. The problem with this contractor is
that not all programs had good internal control systems for
all facets of the program operations from finance to
production. In addition, this contractor had some problems
with their subcontractors.
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The contract administrators are "pushing" this contractor
now. If Government oversight is removed, what incentive does
the contractor have to keep on schedule? One of the IS's
suggestions for an incentive to motivate the contractor is to
include a monetary award in a contract clause if the
contractor successfully participates in the self-oversight of
potential delinquent deliveries.
The IS also commented that if the contractor self-
oversight program was initiated, the Government should do more
front end analysis of the contractor's internal control
system. The contractor should have an established internal
control system which adequately addresses costs, reliability,
and producibility . In addition, a regular management review
of the system should also be in place. Most importantly, the
Government needs to ensure that the contractor meets the
contractual requirements, satisfies the customer's needs,
establishes good lines of responsibility and communication,
and focuses on problem prevention.
2. CONTRACTOR B CASE STUDY
Contractor B has been working with the Government for
over 20 years and presently holds over 120 Government
contracts. This contractor supplies spares for various
aircraft platforms. Sometimes they perform subcontractor work
for other contractors on major Government programs. The
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majority of contracts held with the Government are Firm Fixed
Price.
Contractor B has a large facility to support all the
various Government contracts. In addition, they have a very
stable work force. The biggest problem that contractor B
faces is with its vendors. The most frequent reason for delay
is late supplies and material from vendors.
According to the Technical Specialist on the contract
administration team responsible for contractor B, the
contractor has a total quality system in place for all aspects
of its operations. Everything from contract review to
financial accounting is quality driven. Presently, this
contractor is going through the process of receiving its ISO
9000 certification.
Two years ago, the contractor had a delinquency rate of
42%.
.
With the help of the technical specialist, they
developed a procedure for self-reporting delays. The
contractor created a system that monitored all outstanding
contracts and subsequently pulled up all contract line items
that were coming due, 60 days in advance. The contractor also
established a fail safe date by which the product needed to be
ready. This was fifteen days prior to the required date set
by the Government.
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The Technical Specialist also noted communication
problems between management and the people on the "floor."
Many times a product was ready to ship, but the workers on the
floor did not know when to ship it. With the help of the
Technical Specialist, the contractor developed a contract flow
down program to make both management and the people on the
production floor aware of contractual commitments. [Ref 32] As
a result, the contractor's delinquency rate was reduced to 2%
and their forecasting abilities were above 90% each month
(Figure 10)
.
Contractor B maintains a good working relationship with
the Government. According to the Technical Specialist,
communication is the key to success. Communication helped
transform a good contractor to an outstanding contractor.
Both sides were willing to listen and incorporate suggestions
for improvement
.
Although contractor A had a slightly better record of
forecasting, they did not instill the same trust in the
contract administration team as did contractor B. Contractor
B was proactive and more forthcoming with problems.
Contractor B had a total quality internal control system for
each and every program or contract held with the Government.
Conversely, contractor A did not invest in a quality control
system for each of its programs. One program was a one time
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contract, so the contractor was not interested in having an
internal control system to monitor the program. As a result,
this program has had problems with maintaining its production
schedule. [Ref 32]
The contractor's past forecasting record alone is
insufficient to accept the contractor into a self-reporting
program. Other considerations should be made, such as what
type of internal control system is in place, before
participation in a Government self-oversight program is
allowed.
E. PROCAS CASE STUDY
In April 1992, Magnavox Electronic Systems Company,
Indianapolis, Indiana was selected as a pilot site for PROCAS
implementation. At the time, 80% of Magnavox* s contracts with
the Government were Firm Fixed Price and the remaining 20%
were Cost Plus Incentive Fee. Prior to their selection for
the program, Magnavox experienced problems in delivering their
products. They were placed in the Contractor Improvement
Program (CIP) in 1988. In 1989, the president of Magnavox
changed the organization's philosophy to one of empowerment,
team work, and continuous improvement. The president also
established a strong ethics program. This was one of the keys
to their success later in the PROCAS program. [Ref 33]
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With their change in business philosophy, they were
selected to participate in the PROCAS program. Since
implementation, contract delinquency rates were reduced from
17.65 percent to 2.3 percent in September 1995. In addition,
their on-time delivery rate increased from 14 percent in 1989
to 97 percent in 1995. [Ref 4:p.72]
Although there are many PROCAS success stories, there
have been just as many failures. An audit report conducted by
the Inspector General claimed that DCMC did not effectively
manage the quality assurance work force at 13 sites. The DCMC
personnel did not effectively implement the PROCAS program at
these sites. The problems identified at these sites were as
follows
:
* DCMC did not adequately prioritize the need to
identify critical manufacturing processes for
PROCAS,
* DCMC did not hold their personnel responsible for
implementation of PROCAS, and
* DCMC did not hold supervisors responsible for
reviewing and evaluating the identification of,
and proofing of processes.
Consequently, PROCAS implementation at these sites did not
ensure that the Government was accepting products produced
with reliable processes that would produce a conforming
product. [Ref 22:p.8]
What did Magnavox have that was absent at these other
sites? Why did they succeed while other failed? A number of
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factors contributed to the successful implementation of PROCAS
at Magnavox:
* Support and commitment from internal top
management,
* Support from superiors outside the organization,
* Tailoring the program to the organization's needs,
* Training workers and management,
* Information sharing between the organization and
the Government,
* Shared goals between the organization and the
Government,
* Preexisting total quality environment,
* Caliber of the work force,
* Recognition of achievements,
* Empowerment of the work force,
* Cross functional teaming, and
* Creation of a positive environment. [Ref 4: pp. 7 8-
80]
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY
With dwindling resources, Government oversight
capabilities are becoming less and less flexible. The
Government must tailor the amount of oversight based on the
level of risk associated with a contractor's operations. As
indicated previously with the Government's performance in
issuing RDFs, the personnel resources do not exist to provide
complete contract delivery surveillance to all contractors.
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Self-oversight programs are one solution to the
diminishing resources that the Government possesses, but they
should not be blindly implemented. As viewed earlier with
contractor A, a contractor can be in compliance with
forecasting delivery schedules, but compliance is only
superficial if there is no type of internal control mechanism
to flag problems in production.
We suggest that there is no set formula to determine
oversight requirements. DCMC must tailor their oversight
activities and consider all variables for each situation.
Risk assessment is very important and more time needs to be
devoted to this area of predelivery surveillance.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
The world in which the DoD must operate has changed
dramatically within the last ten years. All DoD activities
have had to either compete fiercely for scarce resources or
develop alternative means of conducting operations. Budget
and personnel constraints have prompted DCMC to investigate
all measures which can improve the efficiency and
effectiveness of DoD's defense contractor oversight.
Ultimately, it is essential to formulate programs that
identify those contractors where not only the risk associated
with reducing, disengaging or redesigning Government oversight
is low, but where the Government's end product will still be
of high quality and delivered in a timely fashion.
As late as September 1994, a DoD Inspector General (IG)
report found that DCMC lacked an effective process for
determining manpower requirements in the oversight process.
[Ref 5:p.5-4] In addition, the IG team found little documented
evidence that the customer's essential needs or the adequacy
of contractor controls influenced decisions on how to deploy
limited personnel resources. They concluded that the
intensity of oversight is not necessarily driven by changes in
risk, but by available manpower. [Ref 5:p.5-4] The team also
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recommended that DCMC develop a risk assessment methodology to
determine oversight reguirements
.
In 1995, DCMC's new instruction manual, entitled the "One
Book," presented a methodology for performing contractor risk
assessment. This contractor risk assessment methodology for
determining Government oversight was previously discussed in
chapter three. Although DCMC has developed a risk assessment
methodology, each DCMAO and DPRO must implement it in a way
that considers all of the variables for each contract. There
is no guarantee that the personnel resources needed to perform
risk assessment will be readily available at each DCMAO or
DPRO.
As mentioned previously, DCMC is eliminating military
standards for manufacturing processes in favor of commercial
standards. With the "Single Process Initiative," contractors
can modify existing contracts which contain MIL Q standards.
Although this initiative might provide substantial cost
savings for contractors using both military and commercial
standards in their manufacturing processes, it may initially
cause problems for the contract administration team members.
When performing risk assessment, they may not be familiar with
commercial standards, such as ISO 9000.
As previously viewed with the RDF performance, 100%
contract delivery surveillance is not being provided to the
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customer. Part of the problem is that all contracts now
require predelivery surveillance. This places an extra burden
on DCMC personnel; the work load has increased without a
similar increase in the work force. Although manpower
constraints limit DCMC's ability to perform contract delivery
surveillance, contractor self-oversight programs, such as
self-reporting delays, should not be blindly embraced as the
panacea to contract delivery surveillance problems. There
should be criteria established to participate in such a
program.
In the past, programs such as PROCAS have had their
successes and failures. Successes, as viewed with Magnavox,
were due in part to top commitment in management from both the
contractor and the Government, mutual trust, open lines of
communication, and empowerment to personnel within the lower
rungs of the organization. [Ref 33] The bottom line is that
personnel resources are dwindling at DCMC and unfortunately
the time available for oversight can quickly become the amount
of oversight applied.
B. CONCLUSIONS
DCMC's newest initiative of contractor self-oversight,
self-reporting delivery delays has the potential to be an
effective method for tailoring oversight. Although DCMC is
still collecting forecasting data from participating DCMAOs
65
and DPROs, the two case studies previously presented provide
a foundation for potential characteristics when selecting
participants for this program. Contractors should meet
certain criteria to participate in a self-oversight, self-
reporting program.
The two case studies indicate that more must be involved
in selecting participants for the initiative than just a 90%
or better forecasting ability for at least three consecutive
months. As seen with contractor A, the contractor could
initially be in compliance with delivery forecasts. However,
if there is no internal control mechanism for flagging
problems in production, material control, etc., forecasting
performance can decline rapidly when operations fail to run
smoothly.
As seen with the two case studies and the successful
PROCAS example, a number of factors can be identified that
would increase the probability of success for any self-
oversight initiative:
* Support and commitment from internal top
management,
* Support from external stakeholders,
* Tailoring of oversight to the organization,
* Communication of information throughout the whole
organization and with the Government, and
* Empowerment of the work force. [Ref 4:pp.78-79]
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It is important to note, however, that even if the
contractor exhibits the qualities listed above, it may not be
advisable to adopt a self-oversight program. Customer
requirements or safety concerns may justify full oversight,
even if contractor performance and program history are
assessed as low risk (i.e. National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) , the Navy Nuclear Propulsion Program,
etc. ) . [Ref 5:p.5-5]
The potential for successful contractor self-oversight
and self-reporting of delivery delays lays with the risk
assessment performed by the contract administration team. If
the Government focuses on performing this portion of the
contract delivery surveillance process well, it will reduce
the risk of allowing contractor participation in a self-
reporting program. There are several existing Government
programs for identifying quality contractors. These programs
can assist in the risk assessment process. The include, but
are not limited to:
* Malcolm Baldridge National Quality Award
Assessment,
* Quality Products and Qualified Manufacturers List,
and
* Past performance information (customer and
internal audits)
.
There are also some certifications, such as ISO 9000,
that should be considered when determining a contractor's
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capability for contract compliance. These reviews and
certifications should not replace Government risk assessment,
but supplement the process. [Ref 5:p.5-10] As mentioned
previously in chapter four, the majority of Government
contracts held in each case study was Firm Fixed Price. If
delivery is an issue, designing contracts which promote an
environment conducive to self-reporting may be an option worth
investigating. Contract types such as Fixed Price Award Fee
or Fixed Price Incentive Fee allow for an award fee pool of
dollars that will reward a contractor for delivering ahead of
schedule or reporting any delays accurately.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
DCMC should continue its commitment to contractor self-
oversight and self-reporting of delivery delays. To further
determine the feasibility of this program, the following
recommendations for study are provided:
* Perform cost benefit analysis of the monetary
effectiveness of the program as more cost data
becomes available,
* Analyze the effectiveness of the ALERTS method for
reporting delays in deliveries as more data
becomes available, and
* As more companies receive ISO 9000 certifications,
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